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In the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis replaced 
America’s ally, the Shah, with an Islamic Republic that, to the present day, poses a threat to 
American interests in the Middle East.  The two events left searing images in the minds of 
Americans and signaled the beginning of America’s global struggle against Islamic extremists.  
The individual who is often blamed for this “loss” of Iran is former president Jimmy Carter.  
Because the crises in Iran occurred while Carter was in office, many critics have come to the 
conclusion that Carter was a “weak and indecisive” president.1  By examining outcomes alone, 
they appeared to be correct.  Although Carter publicly professed the desire to change America’s 
role in international relations, his foreign policy was not particularly distinctive from his Cold 
War predecessors in practice, and many critics believe that his unwavering commitment to the 
Shah helped bring upon the revolution.  However, outcomes alone do not tell the whole story.  
As president, Carter was not blindly idealistic or loyal to the Shah or to the Iranian government, 
and his policies were not solely responsible for “losing” Iran.  In order to pass judgments on the 
quality of Carter’s foreign policy, historians and critics must first carefully research the origins 
of individual policies in order to determine why Carter chose the particular courses of action that 
he did, and what other alternatives might have been available. 
An initiative of Carter’s that has especially been misunderstood was his global human 
rights policy.  Like much of the administration’s foreign policy, its intentions were to set a new 
moralistic course in international relations and to move America away from outdated Cold War 
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ideologies.2  However, Carter’s inconsistent implementation of the policy has led most historians 
to disregard its importance.  Because Carter appeared to defer to the foreign policies of previous 
Cold War presidents, the issues of human rights and an American foreign policy infused with 
morals appeared to be little more than shrewd political rhetoric.  In terms of Iran, and like most 
other Cold War foreign policy makers, Carter was reluctant to pursue a drastic new course.  For 
many years, the Shah had been effective at providing a certain level of stability to the Middle 
East, and Carter did not want to be remembered as the president who upset this delicate balance.  
Consequently, the issue of human rights would become the wildcard of Carter’s term in office.  
The new and strikingly liberal policy would embolden Iran’s intellectual opposition and raised 
the world’s hope in American humanitarianism, but it would also place Carter in a vulnerable 
political position.  As biographer Robert Strong writes, “Carter tried to deal with human rights in 
a serious fashion without ignoring other foreign policy goals.”3  This gave the appearance that 
Carter was trying to have it all ways, and in the process he would satisfy no one. 
This essay will demonstrate what effects Carter’s human rights policy had on the Iranian 
Revolution and Carter’s presidency.  In particular, the essay’s analysis will focus on the first two 
years of Carter’s term, when human rights were especially a priority in his foreign policy and 
when Iran’s various opposition movements experienced resurgences.  Before examining Carter’s 
human rights policy in relation to Iran, the ideological constructions of the policy will be 
examined to determine Carter’s motives for advocating human rights and why Carter placed it so 
high on his foreign policy agenda.  Following this, and through the use of declassified 
government documents, the Carter administration’s inconsistencies will be explored in order to 
determine how the administration applied its human rights policy and how this affected internal 
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events in Iran.  Particular focus will be given to the Iranian opposition movements and how 
Carter’s promise of human rights affected the nature of their protests.  This essay does not 
absolve Carter or his policies from responsibility, like many of his biographers have done.  Nor 
does it contend that Carter was solely to blame for the unfavorable events that occurred in Iran, 
like many of his sharpest critics have claimed.  What this essay argues is that during the first half 
of Carter’s presidency, the policy of human rights gave his administration an opportunity to 
change America’s relations with Iran and to cut ties with the Shah.  More than anything, this 
essay may be viewed as a case study of how the Carter administration’s human rights policy was 
applied in countries and regions where great American interests were at stake.  From this point, it 
can be determined how the Carter administration formulated and practiced its foreign policy in 
Iran, the reasons the President chose to maintain his support for the Shah, how Carter’s support 
of the Shah affected Iran’s internal struggles, and how the policy of human rights continues to 
obscure Carter’s legacy as a foreign policy maker. 
The idea of a foreign policy framed around human rights publicly emerged first in 1976 
as part of the Democratic Party’s election platform.4  It was conceived by Carter and other 
Democrats as a way for America to return to its “fundamental liberal principles that all too often 
had been ignored or even ridiculed by cold war foreign policy professionals.”5  According to 
Carter, American foreign policy had been promoting repression instead of progress.6  A year 
before the election, Carter had expressed concern in his autobiography, titled Why Not the Best, 
that the U.S. had fallen away from morality in its foreign policy.7  In Carter’s eyes, recent 
foreign policy makers, notably Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, had promoted a policy that 
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defended American interests at the price of disregarding morality and America’s duty to uphold a 
high standard in the world.8  This doctrine of “realpolitik” was first implemented in the U.S. by 
America’s original “Cold Warriors,” such as George Kennan, and had been applied by many 
American leaders throughout the Cold War.9  It stated that the U.S. must set aside its moralistic 
policies and instead pursue a careful, pragmatic, and realistic foreign policy.  A foreign policy 
crafted around morals and idealism, according to the doctrine, only agitated nationalism and 
communism in the third world, and would lead to more violence and upheaval, thus 
compromising American interests abroad.10  However, Carter believed it was unnecessary for 
American foreign policy makers to choose between morality and interests; both could be 
achieved if the overall moral standard in the world was raised.  Carter believed it was the duty of 
American leaders to construct a foreign policy “rooted in our values” that could properly “serve 
mankind”.11  In addition, Carter and the Democrats believed America’s realpolitik was playing 
directly into the hands of the Soviet Union.  According to this thinking, the U.S. was in no 
position to call attention to the “deplorable repression” sponsored by the Soviets, since the U.S. 
itself was supporting authoritarian dictators for the sake of its interests.12  To Carter, the lack of 
morality in foreign policy exemplified a broader trend of amoral American policy that 
culminated in the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation.13  By reinstituting morality at 
home and abroad through the promotion of global human rights, Carter believed he could restore 
the standing of America’s political institutions, both in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of 
the American people. 
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Politically, Carter’s human rights policy was perceived as being a “no lose issue”.14  
According to Carter’s speech writer during the 1976 campaign, “liberals liked human rights 
because it involved political freedom” and an end to America’s support of dictatorships, while 
“conservatives liked it because it involved criticisms of Russia.”15  In addition, even though the 
American public may have disapproved of the tactics employed by Nixon and Kissinger’s 
foreign policy, they did not widely disapprove of the results.16  Carter rightly sensed that the 
public did not want to sail too far off the foreign policy course set by the Republicans.  However, 
promoting continuity would not win Carter an election.17  By advocating for human rights, 
Carter could set himself apart from the Republicans without appearing to be too radical.  Be
bipartisanism, human rights were perceived as the glue that could hold the Democratic Party 
together, which had been bitterly divided in the previous two election losses.
yond 
                                                
18   In the mid-
1970s, the general public continued to hold Democrats responsible for the escalation of the 
Vietnam War under President Lyndon Johnson.19  Therefore, the promotion of global human 
rights and policies that distanced the Democrats from the Cold War era could help them escape 
their damaging legacy of the 1960s.   
However, the motives behind Carter’s desire to restore morality and promote global 
human rights went much deeper than politics.  His personal experiences as a southerner growing 
up in Georgia influenced his future decisions as a foreign policy maker.20  Carter’s Christian 
background and his mother’s atypical beliefs heavily affected the mindset of the budding 
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politician.  Young Jimmy had been an anomaly in the American segregated south because he 
spent a considerable amount of time interacting with African Americans as a child.21  In 
addition, his mother had participated in the Peace Corps in India and believed very str
desegregation.
ongly in 
                                                
22  These experiences and ingrained beliefs would profoundly affect Carter’s 
mindset towards race relations and human rights for all people.  When Carter served as a 
member of a local school board as a young man, he refused to join the White Citizens’ Council 
that strongly opposed integration in public schools.23  Although he did not always publicize his 
beliefs for fear of political backlash, Carter’s human rights policy was derived from an 
upbringing in which he witnessed the dilemmas of an unequal society first hand.  As president, 
Carter would draw upon these experiences as he attempted to bring human rights and equality to 
the political limelight. 
Carter entered the Oval Office in January of 1977 believing that the Cold War had neared 
its conclusion, and that the traditional fight against the Soviet Union and communism had 
become outdated.24  In recent years, Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, no matter how 
morally bankrupt, had brought about a détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the 
Cold War seemed to be burning itself out.  As historian H.W. Brands remarks, Carter “strove 
manfully to refashion the national interest to suit the new post-Cold War era.”25  New methods 
and ideologies had to be implemented in order for America to restore its standing in the world 
and make amends for its ill-conceived war in Vietnam.  As Carter stated, an “inordinate fear of 
communism” drove American foreign policy makers to “fight fire with fire” in areas of the world 
that otherwise were unimportant to the U.S.  The “tragic experience of Vietnam”, according to 
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23 Borstelmann, 244. 
24 Ninkovich, 248. 
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Carter, had shown Americans that “fire is better quenched with water”.26  Although it would 
soon be proven that the Cold War was far from being over, a “soft” foreign policy promoting 
human rights initially appeared to be the solution for the new global picture that Carter 
envisioned.   
In his inaugural address, Carter stressed that America’s “commitment to human rights 
must be absolute.”27  In the early weeks and months of 1977, Carter, along with several key 
members of his administration, set out to articulate what exactly he meant by “human rights”.28  
Although there were other key elements to Carter’s foreign policy—such as scaling back 
armaments and nuclear weapons, improving relations with America’s allies, and assisting 
developing nations—human rights, at least publicly, was the administration’s top priority.29  In a 
speech delivered by the new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in April 1977, Vance explained 
that all persons of the world possessed the “right to be free from governmental violation of the 
integrity of the person.”30  This meant that America must treat harshly those governments who 
sponsored “torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or 
imprisonment.”  In addition, Vance stated that “civil and political liberties” must be upheld, and 
that “vital needs,” such as “food, shelter, health care, and education,” must be ensured for all 
citizens.  It appeared as though the Carter administration would grant no exceptions to human 
rights violators.  In terms of the Shah of Iran, the administration privately expressed concern in 
classified correspondence that their traditional ally was exercising “unsatisfactory” human rights 
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practices.31  Although not known at the time, the way in which Carter chose to address these 
practices in Iran would turn out to be the major foreign policy issue of his presidency. 
In order to enforce the human rights policy, the Carter administration realized that clear 
consequences had to be established for violating nations.  The leverage for this was American 
humanitarian aid and financial assistance.  To ensure that nations were in compliance with the 
human rights standards set by the administration, as well those of the UN and Amnesty 
International, the Carter administration dangled the carrot of the American dollar.32  As Carter 
stated early in his presidency:  
In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance program, we will 
demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a 
democratic path to development.  Towards regimes which persist in wholesale violations 
of human rights we will not hesitate to convey our outrage nor will we pretend that our 
relations are unaffected.33  
Many of the regimes in question, including the Shah’s government in Iran, relied on 
American financial and military support for survival.  By stating that human rights violators 
would no longer be American aid recipients, the Carter administration was hoping to force 
nations into compliance.  The nations that did comply were supposed to receive considerable 
amounts of humanitarian and economic assistance.  Since many of the nations in question were 
poor and politically unorganized, they were also extremely dependent on American assistance.  
Carter believed that not receiving American aid was a choice most countries would not dare to 
make.   
                                                 
31 Classified memo: “Significance of Iran to United States Global Policy and Regional Objectives,” January 1977, 
National Security Archive, Iran, the Making of U.S. policy, 1977-1980, edited by Eric Hooglund (Alexandria, VA: 
Chadwyck-Healey, 1990), Accessed through University of Delaware Library Microfiche. 
32 Ladeen and Lewis, 68-69. 
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However, some nations would challenge Carter’s resolve.  The policy’s greatest test 
would come in countries where the U.S. possessed historic mutual interest-based relationships.  
The clearest example of this in the 1970s was Iran.  For years, American leaders had maintained 
a delicate relationship with Iran’s government under the Shah.  In 1953 the CIA covertly 
participated in a coup in which “the pluralistic regime of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq” 
was overthrown and replaced with the Shah.34  The Shah, or Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was 
descended from a family dynasty that had long claimed authority as the historic rulers of Iran.35  
The close relationship the Pahlavi dynasty shared with Great Britain and the United States 
encouraged the CIA to reinstall the Shah to power.  The fear of Soviet expansionism, combined 
with Iran’s geographic position on the Soviet Union’s southern border, aroused enough fears in 
Washington to plot a replacement to Mosaddeq’s government.  Also, the “loss” of China in 1949 
and the war in Korea beginning in 1950 heightened concerns that other nations in Asia and the 
Middle East would quickly succumb to communism.36  Additionally, an unfriendly Iranian 
government could have devastating consequences for Western economies heavily reliant on 
imported Iranian oil.37  The end result of the coup was a puppet regime in Iran, and the Shah 
legitimized his government through authoritarianism and repression.38  A mutual alliance was 
established in which the U.S. and Iran defended one another’s interests.  The U.S., through the 
Shah, could contain communism and ensure access to Iran’s oil, and the Shah could maintain 
authority and power in Iran through U.S. military aid and technical assistance.  In 1955 the Shah 
                                                 
34 For a historical framework of the 1953 coup and its implications in future American foreign policy, see Mark J. 
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35 For a history of the Pahlavi dynasty and the Shah’s family lineage, see Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure: the Fall of 
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36 A brief evaluation of Iran in the context of early American Cold War policy can be found in Gasiorowski, 50-56. 
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even signed his country into the Baghdad Pact, which stated that its purpose was “the 
containment of the Soviet Union” in the region’s affairs.39   
As much as the Shah was favorable to the interests of the U.S., he was equally as 
detrimental towards the humanitarian situation in his own country.  Even amidst the Shah’s 
many reforms, the underclass of Iranian society showed little upward mobility.40  In addition, the 
civil rights and political freedoms in Iran under the Shah were generally regarded as deplorable.  
Although the middle class in Iranian society grew steadily, the extent to which Iranians could 
conduct collective political action was extremely limited.  The historic liberal opposition to the 
Shah, the National Front, was almost completely shut out of the political process.41  The Iranian 
secret police, SAVAK, would arrest political opponents without cause, imprison them, and 
sentence them without trial.42  Traditional political uprisings and protests through the media 
were also ruthlessly suppressed.  This environment created a climate of fear that helped to secure
the Shah’s power.  Much of the technical apparatuses that SAVAK used to gather intelligence 
and repress political opponents of the Shah were supplied by the U.S.
 
s, 
led 
                                                
43  As the Shah’s power 
waned in 1970s, SAVAK became increasingly violent; assassinations, bombings, staged fire
and torture were all used to discourage Iranians from acting in opposition to the Shah.  This 
Amnesty International to declare in 1975 that “no country in the world has a worse record in 
human rights than Iran.”44  For many years, the Shah got away with brutal governing tactics 
because the U.S. supported his regime.  However, by 1977, this era appeared to be coming to an 
 
39 Christos Ioannides, America’s Iran: Injury and Catharsis (Lanham, MD, 1984), 3. 
40 The Shah’s repressive tactics impacted the economic as well as social situation in Iranian society. For further 
detail, see Gasiorowski, chapter 5. 
41 See Gasiorowski, chapter 7. 
42 For a brief explanation of SAVAK and other repressive police and paramilitary Iranian groups and activities 
sponsored by the Shah, see Gasiorowski, 151-165. 
43 Gasiorowski, 158-159. 
44 Gasiorowski, 157. 
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end as Carter’s human rights policy spoke directly to the type of humanitarian and civil rights 
violations that the Shah had relied on for years to maintain authority.   
In the early months of his presidency, Carter did not publicly address the Shah’s human 
rights violations, saving his concerns for private conversations.  Carter realized that he had to 
choose his public pronouncements carefully, lest he jeopardize American’s considerable interests 
in Iran.  As a confidential State Department memo explained, “A frontal attack by the United 
States government on the human rights situation in Iran will backfire.”45  However, the Shah 
took notice that Carter was dissimilar in many ways to most other Cold War-era presidents.  
Carter’s vow to promote human rights in every corner of the globe signaled to the Shah that his 
special relationship with the U.S. might be affected.  The first major sign of this change was the 
decision to restructure arms sales to Tehran.46  To help ensure that his government’s relationship 
with the U.S. did not wane, the Shah began to relax restrictions against political protesters in the 
spring of 1977.47  Iran’s liberal nationalists took this as an opportunity to “start their campaign 
against repression.”48  In June of 1977, three members of Iran’s liberal movement published a 
short letter demanding “the respect of constitutionalism and human rights.”49  In addition, the 
newly revived Iranian intellectual circle known as the “Writers Association” published a similar 
letter signed by forty members later in the month.  As one of the signers of the second letter 
stated, “The government wouldn’t dare jail us in the present climate on human rights.”50  Many 
liberal opposition groups began to meet regularly and publicly.  SAVAK and other security 
forces were arresting fewer protestors and were employing less violent tactics than in previous 
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years.51  The relaxation of repression due to Carter’s human rights policy allowed the liberal 
opposition a chance to grow and flourish.  The members of these groups varied in occupation 
and ranged from doctors and lawyers to writers, intellectuals, and other professionals.52  The 
common goal of these groups was to force the Shah to put an end to his despotic practices and 
uphold Iran’s 1906 Constitution.53   
In addition to relaxing repression and allowing for some measures of peaceful protest, the 
Shah also responded to the Carter administration’s private pressures that International Red Cross 
volunteers be allowed to inspect Iran’s human rights situation.54  In the summer of 1977, as the 
Shah allowed the Red Cross access to Iranian prisons and Iranian courts, the Carter 
administration began to take notice.55  As a confidential memo stated in the summer of 1977, the 
Carter administration was pleased by the Shah’s “recent significantly more open approach to 
human rights matters.”56  Another state department official also noted that the Shah had made 
“significant and important developments in the field of human rights” that year.57  It was clear 
that the Shah was at least trying to meet the human rights principles that Vance articulated in his 
April speech.  Because of this, Carter’s relationship with the Shah began to improve by the fall 
of 1977.  The administration believed that the Shah was moving in a liberal direction and Carter 
believed that it was safe to work out a new arms deal with Tehran.58  Of course, the Shah’s 
reforms were largely for show, as he desperately tried to avoid falling out of Washington’s favor.  
In the same vein, Carter granted the Shah a great deal of leniency because of the unique 
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relationship between the two nations.  As a classified memo titled “Human Rights Goals – Iran” 
stated in the first part of 1978, “U.S. interests in Iran must be seen against a complex set of 
factors,” which included “the unusually broad and valuable relationship between the two 
countries” and “Iran’s ancient tradition of authoritarian government.”59  By framing the 
relationship with Iran in this context, the Carter administration enabled the Shah to view his 
relationship with Washington as purely interest-based and not pursuant on Iran’s commitment to 
human rights.  The Carter administration also intentionally refrained from keeping human rights-
related data on Iran in order to put off having to take action against Tehran.60  The Shah would 
not have to democratize, as long as he was saving political face by meeting Carter’s minimum 
human rights guidelines and was protecting American interests in the region.  This type of 
relationship would spell trouble for both leaders in the second half of Carter’s term. 
The warming of relations between Carter and the Shah allowed both leaders to go ahead 
with the Shah’s scheduled year-end visit to Washington in November of 1977.  Amidst a barrage 
of protest outside the White House, the two leaders met inside for talks that mainly focused on 
oil, weapons deals, and the economic issues of the world.61  The Shah’s human rights practices 
were touched upon but were in no way the main focus of the talks.  This agenda was hardly in 
line with Carter’s public pronouncement that human rights were his administration’s top foreign 
policy priority.  Following the November talks, the White House released a statement to the 
press indicating that “the two men had reviewed the positive steps Iran was taking on the matter 
of human rights.”62  A secret State Department paper addressed to Carter stated that “the Shah 
left Washington ‘profoundly satisfied’ with the results of his talks with you” and that he was 
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equally “gratified by your strong reiteration of the special relationship with his country.”63  This 
illustrates how the president and the Shah were mutually relieved that human rights had not 
gotten in the way of seemingly more important matters, such as oil prices. 
Much of the same sentiments were expressed during Carter’s New Year’s visit to Tehran.  
In preparation for the trip, the Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, addressed a memo 
to Carter outlining five imperative American foreign policy objectives relating to Iran that Carter 
was encouraged to pursue in his talks with the Shah.64  They included energy and oil concerns, 
nuclear cooperation, and Middle East stability.  Christopher’s last listed objective was human 
rights concerns, and only as they related to maintaining Iranian law and order.  The low priority 
given to human rights would continue during the actual visit.  Even as Iran’s human rights 
situation was once again deteriorating in the last three months of 1977, Carter was encouraged by 
State Department officials not to pressure the Shah on the issue for fear that the Shah would not 
“prefer it”.65  The toughest action Carter was urged to take in regards to human rights in Iran was 
to “encourage the Shah to continue the positive course” established in the spring and early 
summer of 1977.66  During the New Year’s talks, Carter gently broached the subject of human 
rights and was once again reassured by the Shah that his regime was very much concerned with 
human rights for all of its citizens.  This appeared to be good enough for Carter, because on New 
Year’s Eve, he would deliver the greatest praise for the Shah of his presidency.  At a state dinner 
that night, Carter toasted the Shah by claiming that “Iran, because of great leadership, is an 
island of stability.”  Carter continued by stating that the Iranian people loved and admired their 
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leader, and that a “remarkable” transformation had taken place in Iran due to the Shah’s great 
“wisdom,” “judgment,” and “sensitivity.”67  Although some of Carter’s hyperbole must be 
understood in the context of the festive environment, his toast cannot fully be dismissed because 
it did represent the administration’s reinforcement of its commitment to the Shah. 
The friendly manner of the Carter-Shah meetings in November and the new year 
encouraged the Shah to believe that his relationship with Washington was solidly intact.  This 
allowed the Shah to once again disregard human rights in Iran since he had little fear of reprisal 
from his lifeline, the United States.  Crackdowns on liberal opposition groups by the police and 
SAVAK intensified in the winter months of 1977, including those on opposition meetings and 
peaceful protests.68  The correlation between the Carter-Shah meetings and an increase in 
government-sponsored repression appears high.  Beating, arrests, and covert violent attacks 
against “freedom seekers” all increased as 1977 came to a close.69  The Muslim wing of 
opposition fared even worse.  SAVAK launched a campaign in the late months of 1977 and the 
early months of 1978 to eliminate the leaders of “clandestine guerrilla groups.”70 
However, by the middle of 1978 it became clear that the Shah’s strategy had backfired, as 
the many resistance factions began to join together in order to achieve the common goal of 
ousting the Shah.71  The Shah’s violent tactics especially encouraged the poor masses of Iran’s 
urban centers to join the emerging Islamic movement.  State sponsored repression had 
encouraged many Iranians to collectively rally around their religious institutions located in large 
urban areas.  Demographically, Iran had transformed from a rural nation into an urban one with 
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fifty percent of the total population residing in towns or cities by the late 1970s.72  This dense 
concentration of population “provided the occasion for substantial displays of mass protest” that 
would not have been possible years before.73  It also allowed the Islamic movement to preach its 
simple message to Iran’s large population of poor Muslims—that the Shah was degrading 
“Islamic standards of behavior and belief” and thus had to be replaced.74  Religion, according to 
some historians, was “the most efficient vehicle for channeling the revolutionary mood” among 
the masses.75  The liberal opposition did not possess this advantage, as they preached reform 
messages that most of Iran’s Muslim citizens could not relate to their own circumstances.  The 
outcome in 1978 was that Iran’s liberal movement weakened while the Islamic movement gained 
strength.76  The result for Carter was a nightmarish scenario, as his “island of stability” was 
about to become anything but.   
Although the liberal opponents of the Shah were not fond of America’s historic 
intervention in Iranian affairs, their yearnings for a liberal and democratic society matched up 
well with Carter’s human rights policy and America’s founding principles.  In contrast, the 
radical Islamic movement expressed no desire to modernize Iran or embrace liberal reforms.77  
As the Shah continued to waver on human rights, and as the religious movement gained strength, 
the question over why Carter was not able to shift course and endorse Iran’s moderate liberal 
reformers remains.  As explained earlier, liberal nationalists originally considered Carter’s 
human rights policy to be an opportunity for mobilization.  The tactics of these liberal opposition 
                                                 
72 For a brief explanation of how Iran’s changing demographics affected the nature of the Iranian revolution, see 
Fred Halliday, “The Genesis of the Iranian Revolution,” Third World Quarterly 1 (Oct. 1979):13-15. 
73 Halliday, 14. 
74 Ladeen and Lewis, 105. 
75 Gholam R. Afkhami, The Iranian Revolution: Thantos on a National Scale (Washington, D.C., 1985), 201. 
76 The Islamic movement in Iran did not fully take hold until the second half of 1978. With the Shah’s power 
waning, the liberals possessed a real opportunity to spread their movement and attain power. For an explanation of 
why this did not come to fruition, see Afkhami, chapters 6 and 7; Gasiorowski, chapter 7. 
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groups were almost completely non-violent, and its members consisted of professional and 
intellectual citizens.  They professed their displeasure by writing pamphlets, demonstrating in 
small groups, and publishing newspapers.78  This non-violent civil disobedience should have 
appealed to a man like Carter, whose own personal experiences included a southern upbringing 
in the midst of the American civil rights movement.  The liberal opposition of Iran gave Carter 
an opportunity to fully implement his human rights policy and support a much needed and 
peaceful regime change in Iran.  The public principles of Carter’s human rights policy, as stated 
by Vance in April of 1977, were very much consistent with the demands of Iran’s liberal 
opposition.  However, these reasons were not enough for Carter to terminate his relationship with 
the Shah.  The Shah may have been a world class human rights violator, but he had been the safe 
option for many years.  Carter, like his predecessors, was reluctant to give up on America’s 
friend and ally. 
Both Carter and the Shah were caught off guard in the latter part of 1978 when protests in 
Iran began to bolster popular resentment.79  One of the reasons for this was the reliance of Carter 
and the Shah on SAVAK intelligence briefings.  Because the U.S. Foreign Service, including the 
CIA, did not collect data on Iran in order to hide human rights violations, SAVAK became the 
eyes and ears for the conditions on the ground.80  The reason for the lack of U.S.-produced 
intelligence is because Carter remained adamant in allowing the Shah to work out his internal 
problems without covert or direct American interference.81  However, this stance led to flawed 
intelligence that only told the Shah what he wanted to hear, which in turn misled American 
foreign policy makers as well.  As an intelligence briefing summarized from September 1978: 
                                                 
78 For a summary of the liberal oppositions protest tactics, see Siavoshi, 134-137. 
79 Zonis, 254. 
80 For an explanation of American intelligence failures in relation to the Iranian Revolution, see Zonis, chapter 10. 
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“the Shah is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years.”82  In disgust over 
such a misevaluation, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives would later state in a study 
on Iranian intelligence that “no reports based on contacts with the religious opposition had 
appeared” before late 1977, and that “there was absolutely no reporting on the internal situation 
during the first quarter of 1978.”83  Carter’s inaction on Iranian matters was directly connected to 
the misleading intelligence reports he received, which led him to believe that the Shah had 
accepted the message of promoting human rights and that political opposition in Iran was still 
moderate and peaceful in nature.  In addition, these reports encouraged the perception that the 
Shah’s power was firm.  However, as 1978 came to an end, this fallacy began to reveal itself.  As 
far back as January 1977, before Carter’s inauguration, the State Department produced a policy 
paper stating that a “smooth transfer of power” in Iran was unlikely after the fall or death of the 
Shah because of Tehran’s reliance on “one man” leadership.84  The fact that Carter knew this but 
did not take steps to line up a proper successor in Iran shows that he had been misinformed of the 
real political situation.  Even Carter, whose close personal ties to the Shah have been well 
documented, would likely have withdrawn his support earlier if he was aware that the Shah’s 
government was on the brink of collapse.   
However, by the end of 1978, even misleading intelligence reports could not mask the 
truth.  Protests were increasingly turning into violent unrest, and the Shah’s security forces 
became reluctant to use force to suppress them.85  Amidst this turmoil, Carter finally began to 
publicly distance himself from the Shah.  In December 1978, he stated that although his 
administration would “prefer the Shah to maintain a major role in the government,” it was “in the 
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hands of the Iranian people” and he would not intervene with U.S. forces to bail out the Shah.86  
Carter’s sentiments signaled the death knell for the Iranian leader as he could no longer rely on 
the American umbrella to keep him safe.  As 1979 began, it was too late for Carter to distance 
the U.S. from Iran’s problems—the historical relationship between the two nations was too deep 
and his own words and actions had been too supportive of the Shah.  The Islamic movement led 
by Ayatollah Khomeini referenced the Shah’s closeness with America as a way of agitating the 
Iranian masses and bolstering the revolution.87  By the end of the next year, an Islamic Republic 
was solidly established in Tehran, and the Shah was receiving treatment for cancer in exile.   
The Shah had served as America’s greatest and most important ally in the region.  He had 
allowed the U.S. cheap and unrestricted access to Iran’s oil, and had presided over a long period 
of Middle East stability.  However, with the Shah out of power, America suddenly appeared 
vulnerable.  Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter 
was forced to institute the “Carter Doctrine” in his 1980 State of the Union address.  In it, he 
warned that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.”88  Carter’s early 
pronouncements were correct: the U.S. had entered a new period in history.  However, it was not 
an era in which outdated Cold War ideologies would be replaced with new liberal foreign 
initiatives, such as human rights.  Instead, as historian Andrew Bacevich explains, the last two 
years of Carter’s presidency marked the beginning of a new effort on the part of American 
foreign policy makers to “guarantee the ever-increasing affluence” of American society, meaning 
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the protection of America’s access to cheap Middle Eastern oil.89  Since the U.S. had lost their 
most reliable ally in the Middle East, U.S. leaders felt compelled to forcefully defend American 
interests in the region in the years that followed.  In the face of such momentous problems, it is 
easy to understand why Carter’s human rights policy in Iran has been misrepresented and even 
forgotten about. 
Carter’s human rights policy also failed in Iran because, much to his chagrin, it could not 
escape the boundaries or the ideologies of the Cold War.  Carter believed that America had 
entered a new phase in foreign relations upon his election in 1976.  He believed that the 
traditional fight against Soviet communism had become outdated and unnecessarily taxing to the 
U.S., both in terms of dollars and in American effort.  However, even before the fall of the Shah 
and the Carter Doctrine, Carter’s foreign policy in practice was still framed around the same 
concerns as his predecessors.  Carter’s promotion of human rights indirectly supported the 
“realpolitik” doctrine he sought to escape.  Although professing different rhetoric in public, 
Carter’s secret correspondence within his administration was littered with references to the 
Soviet threat and containing communism.  As Frank Ninkovich explains, “human rights, because 
they epitomized the enormous contrast between the ways of life created by the two ideologies, 
was also useful as a symbolic way of fighting the Cold War.”90  Since Carter practiced a foreign 
policy very similar to that of his Cold War predecessors, he could have framed human rights as a 
tool of fighting global communism.  But by insisting that his foreign policy and human rights 
initiatives existed outside of the Cold War, Carter confused foreign governments and alienated 
the very groups that a pro-human rights policy was best suited for.   Iran’s liberal opposition is a 
perfect example.  Carter could never bring himself to support Iran’s liberal nationalist movement 
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as a successor regime, even though his human rights policy appeared to speak directly to what 
they were advocating for.  The leftist leanings of the liberal opposition and their supposed 
sympathies to communists could never be accepted by Carter or any American foreign policy 
maker of the time period.91  This was predetermined by traditional Cold War concerns, whether 
Carter acknowledged it or not.  Similarly, and following perfectly with the doctrine of 
“realpolitik,” Carter put aside his moralistic impulses in Iran because of the Soviet Union’s 
geographical proximity and the desire for regional stability.92  For the first twenty-five years of 
the Cold War, the U.S. had formed a “special commitment” to the Middle East by supporting 
especially oppressive monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia.93  Carter was in no way ready for 
America to withdrawal its historic support from such oil-rich nations, even if their leaders 
blatantly continued to deny human rights.  Once again, Carter’s human rights policy was halted 
by Cold War realities and American interests.  In the last two years of his presidency, Carter 
would be forced to publicly embrace his failures and accept the continued existence of the Cold 
War.  The Carter Doctrine, which came on the heels of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and 
the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, put Carter into the uncomfortable position of 
ratcheting up military spending and admitting that the Cold War had not yet reached a 
conclusion.94  
The result of this was a foreign policy and a president that appeared inconsistent and 
indecisive.  The great moral principles that had driven his entire life seemed lost in Carter’s last 
two years in office, as he was forced to go against his initial policy of human rights and 
reinvigorate the Cold War.  However, this does not mean his administration’s human rights 
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policy was directed by empty idealism.  As biographer Peter Bourne states, “Carter was guided 
by a consistent set of values and beliefs” that remained with him for his entire life, including 
while he was president.95  Carter was not a political “flip-flopper,” nor did he hastily throw 
together different policies in hopes that something positive would result.96  Carter was a firm 
proponent of human rights and remains so to the present day.  His human rights policy has been 
much maligned and yet Carter has never regretted it; ideological consistency has never been his 
problem.  However, Carter ultimately fell short because, for over half of his presidency, he 
refused to acknowledge that he was a Cold War president.  Similarly, and for various reasons, 
Carter could not change course in his official Iranian policy, even as the Iranian revolution 
engulfed and destroyed the Shah’s regime.  His human rights policy appeared to give his 
administration a great opportunity to end America’s client relationship with Iran and to formulate 
a new Middle East policy for the post-Cold War world Carter envisioned.  However, Carter, like 
most other Cold War presidents, could not commit to the unknown and felt it was safer to 
continue the foreign policy already in place.  The fear of being responsible for losing Iran, what 
historian Frank Ninkovich would define as the fear of a “terrible failure,” moved Carter to 
continue America’s support for the anemic Shah.97  A regime change did eventually come to 
Iran, but it came in the form of a revolution that was unfavorable to the interests of the U.S.  
Even amidst these outcomes, Carter stated in his memoirs that the effectiveness of his human 
rights policy should not always have been measured by “inches, pounds, or dollars”; better 
judgments of his policies were to be found in the “revival of hope” and the “lifting of the human 
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spirit” in oppressed peoples.98  If this standard was universally applied, than Carter’s human 
rights policy in Iran was, in part, a success; it did revive hope in Iran’s liberal opposition.  
However, because of the Cold War and America’s historic relationship with the Shah, Carter 
could not follow their “hope” and “human spirit” for liberalization all the way through.  Thus, 
the failure of the United States in Iran became the failure of Jimmy Carter as well. 
                                                 
98 Strong, 97. 
 
 
                               24
Bibliography 
 
Books 
Afkhami, Gholam R. The Iranian Revolution: Thantos on a National Scale. Washington, D.C.: 
            The Middle East Institute, 1985. 
 
Bacevich, Andrew J. The New American Militarism. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 
            2005. 
 
Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the      
            Global Arena. Cambridge, MA, 2001. 
 
Bourne, Peter G. Jimmy Carter: A Comprehensive Biography from Plains to 
            Postpresidency. New York, NY: Scribner, 1997. 
 
Dumbrell, John. The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation. New York, NY: Manchester         
            University Press, 1995. 
 
Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran.mIthaca,            
            NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
 
Hoffman, Elizabeth Cobbs. All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of them 1960s. 
            Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Houghton, David Patrick. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Hostage Crisis. New York, NY:  
            Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Ioannides, Christos P. America’s Iran: Injury and Catharsis. Lanham, MD: University Press of  
            America, 1984. 
 
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. Human Rights and American Foreign Policy. Gambier, OH: Public Affairs  
            Conference Center, Kenyon College, 1982. 
 
Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
            University Press, 2004. 
 
Ledeen, Michael, and William Lewis. Debacle: The American Failure in Iran. New York, NY:  
            Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 1980. 
 
Muravchik, Josua. The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human Rights  
            Policy. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986. 
 
Ninkovich, Frank. The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900. Chicago, IL:  
            University of Chicago Press,1999. 
 
Siavoshi, Susan. Liberal Nationalism in Iran: The Failure of a Movement. Boulder, CO:  
 
                               
 
25
            Westview Press, 1990. 
 
Strong, Robert A. Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign        
            Policy. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 
 
Zonis, Marvin. Majestic Failure: the Fall of the Shah. Chicago, IL: University of 
        Chicago Press, 1991. 
 
Journal Articles 
Brands, H.W. “The Idea of the National Interest.” Diplomatic History 23 (Spring 1999): 239-  
            261. 
 
Halliday, Fred. “The Genesis of the Iranian Revolution.” Third World Quarterly 1 
            (Oct. 1979): 1-16. 
 
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton, and Steven E. Johnson. “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign 
            Assistance from Nixon to Carter.” Journal of Peace Research 21 (Sept. 1984): 215- 226. 
 
Primary Sources 
National Security Archive. Iran, the Making of U.S. policy, 1977-1980, edited by Eric Hooglund 
            (accessed through University of Delaware Library Microfiche). Alexandria, VA:   
            Chadwyck-Healey, 1990.  
 
Woolley, John T., Peters, Gerald. Public Papers of Presidents of the United States: 
            Jimmy Carter, 1977. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California [online]. 
            Available from World Wide Web: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6937 
 
 
